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INTRODUCTION
There is a class of goods known as "public goods," wherein, the
amount of use of the good or service by one person does not re-
duce the amount available to others if the good has been
produced. I
An idea is like a "public good" since its availability to the public is
never diminished with use. In a utilitarian society, the greatest good
would be achieved by the widest possible dissemination of the idea.
Each member of society gains satisfaction from the dissemination of
the idea, and the usefulness of the idea is not diminished with
dissemination.
The policy of the Copyright Act is to promote the widest possible
dissemination of ideas while encouraging production of creative and
innovative works. 2 The Copyright Act balances these countervailing
policies by offering a limited monopoly "in original works of author-
ship fixed in any tangible medium of expression .. "3 Production of
creative and innovative works is encouraged by monopolistic protec-
tion of the author's expression of the idea. Dissemination and use of
the idea by others, however, is never restricted.4
1. A. ALCHIAN & W. ALLEN, EXCHANGE AND PRODUCTION THEORY IN USE 251
(1969).
2. Whelan Assoc., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1235
(3d Cir. 1986); See also Note, Proposed Judicial Guidelines for Deciding Software Infringement
Actions, 32 WAYNE L. REV. 1191, 1196 (1986) (notes these competing policy consider-
ations) [hereinafter Judicial Guidelines].
The policy considerations are derived from the constitutional authority for the
Copyright Act, promoting useful arts by securing exclusive rights:
The fundamental policy underlying the Copyright Act is to promote the dis-
semination of the arts and sciences by providing an incentive for the publi-
cation of new works. This is accomplished by granting the original author
certain exclusive rights in the work. Under copyright law, the limited mo-
nopoly granted must not be so broad that it prevents others from building
upon the ideas expressed in the work. Separating ideas from expressions is
the primary means of balancing these two competing interests of - provid-
ing an incentive to create without allowing an overly restrictive monopoly.
Note, Protecting the "Look and Feel" of Computer Software, 1 HIGH TECHNOLOGY L.J. 411,
419 (1986) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter "Look and Feel"]. "The key is to find a
balance that creates an incentive to produce works of authorship, yet promotes the
spread of learning, culture, and development." Id. at 420.
3. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982). The limited monopoly is in the form of exclusive
rights to reproduce or distribute the copyrighted work or prepare derivative works.
17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982). "[T]he authorization to grant to individual authors the lim-
ited monopoly of copyright is predicated upon the dual premises that the public ben-
efits from the creative activities of authors, and that the copyright monopoly is a
necessary condition to the full realization of such creative activities." 1 M. NIMMER,
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.03[A] at 1-32 (1987).
4. "In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship ex-
tend to any idea .. " 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982). An owner of copyrightable expres-
sion, however, has certain exclusive rights in the use of expression. 17 U.S.C. § 106
(1982).
[Vol. 14
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Determining whether an aspect of an author's work is protected
expression or unprotected idea is problematic where the alleged in-
fringer borrows a nonliteral aspect of the copyrighted work. For ex-
ample, copying the literal aspect of a novel-verbatim copying-is
clearly an infringement of the author's monopoly in the expression.
However, when an infringer borrows a nonliteral aspect of the novel,
like the storyline, it becomes difficult to determine whether the in-
fringer borrowed the idea of the novel or the author's expression of
the idea.5 In the context of computer software, computer instruc-
tions are the literal aspect of the computer program. Nonliteral as-
pects include the "structure, sequence, and organization" of the
computer instructions and the "look and feel" of the program as per-
ceived by the user when the computer instructions are executed in
the computer.
5. See, e.g., Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930).
Judge L. Hand wrote:
[i]t is of course essential to any protection of literary property ... that the
right cannot be limited literally to the text, else a plagiarist would escape by
immaterial variations. That has never been the law, but, as soon as literal
appropriation ceases to be the test, the whole matter is necessarily at
large....
Id. at 121.
To demonstrate the difficulties of separating idea from expression consider Pro-
fessor Nimmer's comparison of "Romeo and Juliet" to "Abie's Irish Rose" and
"West Side Story":
Assuming Shakespeare's works were not in the public domain it is clear that
no one could copy his drama concerning the star-crossed lovers of Verona
merely by paraphrasing the dialogue with new (and no doubt less inspired)
phrases. It is likewise clear that anyone could borrow the "idea" of a ro-
mance between members of two hostile families. Countless stories and
plays have been based upon this abstract idea. Perhaps the most famous of
these in more recent times was "Abie's Irish Rose." No more of "Romeo
and Juliet" is contained in "Abie's Irish Rose" than the above idea. ...
Contrast this with the musical play and motion picture, "West Side Story."
Since this involved a romance between members of two warring juvenile
gangs in contemporary New York City, at first glance it might appear that
this would no more constitute an infringement of "Romeo and Juliet" than
does "Abie's Irish Rose." Certainly the dialogue and setting, and even
much of the characterization, story line and action are far removed from the
Shakespeare play. . . but the essential sequence of events, as well as the
interplay of the characters are straight out of "Romeo and Juliet."
3 NIMMER, supra note 3, § 13.03[A] at 13-26 (footnotes omitted). Nimmer concludes
that "West Side Story" borrows expression from "Romeo and Juliet." Id. at 13-26 to
-27.
1988]
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Idea/Expression Continuum: literal vs. nonliteral aspects.
idea expression
S I I I
function look structure, object code source code
or and sequence, (machine-readable (human-readable
purpose feel and computer computer
of program organization instructions) instructions)
nonliteral aspects literal aspects
On a case by case basis, courts must determine whether a nonlit-
eral aspect of a work is an unprotected idea or a protected expres-
sion.6 Drawing the line between idea and expression in nonliteral
infringement cases is perhaps the most pressing issue in computer
software litigation. 7 First, as an evidentiary matter, it is difficult to
know how to draw the line when proving copyright infringement of
computer software.8 Courts must consider the extent to which ex-
pert testimony is relevant to this determination and what factors
should be applied when separating idea from expression. Second,
drawing the line too near the idea end of the spectrum leads to pro-
tection of works dedicated to the public domain. This converts the
Copyright Act into a general misappropriation statute.9
6. See infra note 46 and accompanying text.
7. Determining where the line should be drawn is equivilent to determining the
scope of protection. "The scope of protection will be of great economic significance
to the computer industry, possibly even more important than protection of the pro-
gramming code itself." Note, "Look and Feel", supra note 2, at 412. The computer
industry is more concerned with protection of the structure, sequence, and organiza-
tion and the look and feel because these aspects of the computer program contain
more creativity than the actual programming of code. See infra notes 52-61 and ac-
companying text. See also Note, "Look and Feel", supra note 2, at 412 n.89.
Illustrative of the ramifications of separating idea from expression, one Note op-
posed extending protection to look and feel in spite of the potential for creative ex-
pression. The Note concluded that there should be no protection because tests for
proving copyright infringement do not effectively separate idea from expression. Id.
at 415.
8. As one author noted, the substantial similarity test for proving copyright in-
fringement is:
one of the most difficult and baffling [issues] in all of copyright law. Any test
for substantial similarity invariably calls for judicial line drawing, and, as
Judge Learned Hand once conceded, these lines seem arbitrarily placed no
matter where drawn. Nevertheless, courts have attempted to fashion tests in
order to provide guidance in detecting substantial similarity.
Note, Proving Copyright Infringement of Computer Software. An Analytical Framework, 18
Loy. L.A.L. REV. 919, 936 (1985) (footnote omitted)[hereinafter Proving Copyright In-
fringement]. See also Knowles & Palmieri, Dissecting Krofft: An Expression of New Ideas in
Copyright?, 8 SAN FERN. V.L. REV. 109, 126 (1980) (arguing that there can be no
meaningful distinction between idea and expression); Note, Diferentiating Idea and
Expression in Copyrighted Computer Software: The Tests for Infringement, 6J.L. & CoM. 419,
423 (1986); Note,Judicial Guidelines, supra note 2, at 1197.
9. See infra notes 116-22 and accompanying text.
(Vol. 14
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This Note addresses these issues in four parts. Part I traces the
legislative history of copyright protection for computer software and
the scope of copyrightable subject matter. Part II discusses the test
for copyright infringement as applied to computer software and the
admissibility of expert testimony to resolve the idea/expression di-
chotomy. Part III analyzes the factors used in separating idea from
expression in nonliteral infringement cases, i.e., structure, sequence,
and organization cases and look and feel cases. Part IV addresses the
criticism that applying the current factors for separating idea from
expression has lead to overprotection of computer software. Analyt-
ically, this Note resolves the evidentiary problem of proving copy-
right infringement in Parts II and III by suggesting a codified
standard for separating idea from expression in nonliteral infringe-
ment cases. Part IV of the Note evaluates the public policy consider-
ations and demonstrates that the proposed standard does not lead to
overprotection.
I. HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR COMPUTER SOFTWARE
A. Legislative History of the Copyright Act
As early as 1964, the United States Copyright Office announced
that copyright protection for computer programs was possible under
the Copyright Act of 1909.10 While copyright problems regarding
computer programs were emerging under the 1909 Act, drafters of
10. Ch. 349, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909). The copyright laws have remained virtually
unchanged since the 1909 Act. H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1976).
In May 1964, the Copyright Office announced that it "had taken the position
that copyright registration for computer programs is possible under the present
law." UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COPYRIGHT REGISTRATION FOR COMPUTER
PROGRAMS, (1964), reprinted in I BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 361 (1964). The
Copyright Office made the following statement:
The registrability of computer programs involves two basic questions:
(1) Whether a program as such is the "writing of an author" and thus copy-
rightable, and (2) whether a reproduction of the program in a form actually
used to operate or be "read" by a machine is a "copy" that can be accepted
for copyright registration.
Both of these are doubtful questions. However, in accordance with its
policy of resolving doubtful issues in favor of registration wherever possible,
the Copyright Office will consider registration for a computer program as a
"book" in Class A if:
(1) The elements of assembling, selecting, arranging, editing, and lit-
erary expression that went into the compilation of the program are suf-
ficient to constitute original authorship.
(2) The program has been published, with the required copyright no-
tice; that is, "copies" (i.e., reproductions of the program in a form per-
ceptible or capable of being made perceptible to the human eye)
bearing the notice have been distributed or made available to the
public.
(3) The copies deposited for registration consist of or include repro-
ductions in a language intelligible to human beings. If the only publica-
tion was in a form that cannot be perceived visually or read, something
1988]
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the revised copyright law found it impossible to legislate the new and
evolving field of computer technology.II As a result, in 1974 Con-
more (e.g., a print-out of the entire program) would also have to be
deposited.
11 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. at 361.
11. In preliminary drafts of the revised copyright law the House Committee on
the Judiciary attempted to draft legislation which would address some of the copy-
right problems created by computer programs. One section of the preliminary draft,
which eventually evolved into 17 U.S.C. § 106, explicitly discusses exclusive rights as
they applied to programming or operations of an information storage system. The
exclusive rights section of the preliminary draft read:
§ 5. Exclusive Rights Comprised in Copyright...
(a) The right to copy or record. Copyright shall include the exclusive right
to copy or record the work in any tangible medium of expression, now
known or later developed, from which it can be visually or aurally perceived,
either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. It shall include the
right to reproduce the work in visual copies, to make or duplicate sound
recordings of it, to make a translation, adaptation, or any other derivative
work from it, and to reproduce it in any form in the programming or operation of an
information storage and retrieval system.
U.S. Congress, HouseJudiciary Committee, Copyright Law Revision, Part 3: Preliminary
Draft for Revised U.S. Copyright Law and Discussions and Comments on the Draft, 88th
Cong., 2d Sess., 4 (1964) (emphasis added) [hereinafter Copyright Law Revision] re-
printed in NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED
WORKS, Final Report 81 (1978) [hereinafter CONTU, FINAL REPORT].
Later drafts of the exclusive rights provision did not explicitly refer to computers
or computer programs. See Copyright Law Revision, Part 5, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 4
(1965), reprinted in CONTU, FINAL REPORT at 82. The Register of Copyrights ex-
plained that:
[I]t would be a mistake for the statute, in trying to deal with such a new and
evolving field as that of computer technology, to include an explicit provi-
sion that could later turn out to be too broad or too narrow. A much better
approach, we feel, is to state the general concepts of copyright in language,
such as that in section 106(a) which would be general in terms and broad
enough to allow for adjustment to future changes in patterns of reproduc-
tion and other uses of authors' works.
Copyright Law Revision, Part 6: 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 18 (1965), reprinted in CONTU
FINAL REPORT at 82-83. See also H.R. REP. No. 83, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1967)
("recognizing the profound impact that information storage and retrieval devices
seem destined to have on authorship, communications, and human life itself, the
committee is also aware of the danger of legislating prematurely in this area of ex-
ploding technology").
Finally in 1969, the Copyright Revision Bill was amended to expressly protect
computer programs; section 117 read:
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 through 116, this title does
not afford to the owner of copyright in a work any greater or lesser rights
with respect to the use of the work in conjunction with automatic systems
capable of storing, processing, retrieving, or transferring information or in
conjunction with any similar device, machine or process, than those afforded
to works under the law, whether title 17 or the common law or statutes of a
State, in effect on December 31, 1970, as held applicable and construed by a
court in an action brought under this title.
S. REP. No. 543, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). Realistically though, section 117 did
not resolve the exclusive rights problems associated with computer programs, but
rather it preserved the common law principles currently applicable. S. REP. No. 983,
[Vol. 14
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gress established the National Commission on New Technological
Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU) to study and compile data on
protection of copyrighted works of authorship in conjunction with
computer uses.
1 2
Congress passed the Copyright Act of 1976 as Title 17 of the
United States Code.' 3 The new copyright act did not explicitly make
computer programs copyrightable subject matter. The House of
Representatives' report on the Act, however, stated that Congress
intended computer programs to fall within the category of copyright-
able "literary works."14 Furthermore, section 117 of the Act verified
the law's application to computer programs by defining the scope of
93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 112 (1974). The Copyright Revision Bill embodying section
117 passed the Senate, September 9, 1974. S. 1362, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., 120 CONG.
REC. 30,516 (1974).
12. Immediately after the Senate passed the Copyright Revision Bill a second bill
was brought before the Senate which established CONTU. Since it was unlikely that
the House would take action on the Copyright Revision Bill, proponents of the bill
felt that it was desirable to establish CONTU "to prepare for the resolution of the
copyright issues which were arising from the rapid development of new technology."
S. 3976, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., 120 CONG. REC. 30,516 (1974). CONTU was estab-
lished in 1974 to:
[S]tudy and compile data on:
(1) the reproduction and use of copyrighted works of authorship
(A) in conjunction with automatic systems capable of storing, process-
ing, retrieving, and transferring information, and
(B) by various forms of machine reproduction not including repro-
duction by or at the request of instructors for use in face-to-face teaching
activities; and
(2) The creation of new works by the application or intervention of such
automatic systems or machine reproduction.
(c) The commission shall make recommendations as to such changes in
copyright law or procedures that may be necessary to assure for purposes
access to copyrighted works, and to provide recognition of the rights of
copyright owners.
S. 3976, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., 120 CONG. REC. 30,516 (1974).
13. Both Houses of Congress considered and passed the Copyright Revision Bill
on September 30, 1976. S. 1733, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG. REc. 33,818
(1976); H.R. REP. No. 1476 at 1, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS,
5659.
14. Section 102(a) of the Act enumerates the works of authorship which qualify
as proper subject matter for copyright.
(a) Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known
or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or other-
wise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.
Works of authorship include the following categories:
(1) literary works;
(2) musical works, including any accompanying words;
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music;
(4) pantomimes and choreographic works;
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; and
(7) sound recordings.
19881
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copyright protection as it pertained to computer programs.' 5 The
purpose of section 117 was merely to preserve the status quo,
thereby leaving CONTU to resolve the computer related issues of
authorship, distribution, and use with definitive copyright
provisions. 16
17 U.S.C § 102(a) (1982).
Computer programs fall within the category of "literary works." Section 101
defines literary works as:
[O]ther than audiovisual works, expressed in words, numbers, or other ver-
bal or numerical symbols or indicia, regardless of the nature of the material
objects, such as books, periodicals, manuscripts, phonorecords, film, tapes,
disks, or cards, in which they are embodied.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976).
"The term 'literary works' does not connote any criterion of literary merit or
qualitative value: it includes ... computer data bases, and computer programs to the
extent that they incorporate authorship in the programmer's expression of original
ideas, as distinguished from the ideas themselves." H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong.
2d Sess. 54 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (94 Stat) at
5659, 5667.
15. Section 117 limits the scope of the exclusive rights defined in section 106 as
such rights relate to computer and similar information systems. Section 117 reads:
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 through 116 and 118... this
title... does not afford to the owner of copyright in a work any greater or
lesser rights with respect to the use of the work in conjunction with auto-
matic systems capable of storing, processing, retrieving, or transferring in-
formation, or in conjunction with any similar device, machine, or process,
than those afforded to works under the law, whether title 17... or the com-
mon law or statutes of a State, in effect on December 31, 1977, as held appli-
cable and construed by a court in an action brought under this title....
17 U.S.C. § 117 (1978).
16. The discussion and analysis from the House Report of section 117 of the
Copyright Act states that:
As the program for general revision of the copyright law has evolved, it
has become increasingly apparent that in one major area the problems are
not sufficiently developed for a definitive legislative solution. This is the
area of computer uses of copyrighted works: the use of a work "in conjunc-
tion with automatic systems capable of storing, processing, retrieving, or
transferring information." The Commission on New Technological Uses is,
among other things, now engaged in making a thorough study of the emerg-
ing patterns in this field and it will, on the basis of its findings, recommend
definitive copyright provisions to deal with the situation.
Since it would be premature to change existing law on computer uses at
present, the purpose of section 117 is to preserve the status quo. It is in-
tended neither to cut off any rights that may now exist, nor to create new
rights that might be denied under the Act of 1909 or under common law
principles currently applicable.
The provision deals only with the exclusive rights of a copyright owner
with respect to computer uses, that is, the bundle of rights specified for
other types of uses in section 106 and qualified in sections 107 through 116
and 118. With respect to the copyright-ability [sic] of computer programs,
the ownership of copyrights in them, the term of protection, and the formal
requirements of the remainder of the bill, the new statute would apply.
Under section 117, an action for infringement of a copyrighted work by
means of a computer would necessarily be a federal action brought under
the new title 17. The court, in deciding the scope of exclusive rights in the
computer area, would first need to determine the applicable law, whether
[Vol. 14
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CONTU recommended two statutory changes to the Copyright
Act of 1976: 1) an addition to section 101 defining computer pro-
grams "to make it explicit that computer programs, to the extent that
they embody an author's original creation, are proper subject matter
of copyright;"' 7 and 2) a revision of section 117 "to ensure that
rightful possessors of copies of computer programs may use or adapt
these copies for their use."1 8 Congress responded to these recom-
mended statutory changes by enacting the Computer Software Act of
1980, which amended the Copyright Act of 1976 to conform with
CONTU's recommendations.' 9
State statutory or common law or the Act of 1909. Having determined what
law was applicable, its decision would depend upon its interpretation of
what that law was on the point on the day before the effective date of the
new statute.
Notes of Committee on theJudiciary, H.R. No. 94-1476 at 116, reprinted in 1976 U.S.
CoDE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (94 Stat) at 5731.
17. CONTU, FINAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 1.
18. Id. The purpose of revising section 117 was to ensure that possessors of
copyrighted computer programs would be allowed to use the programs freely to ac-
complish the tasks for which they are intended. CONTU recognized two problematic
areas of copyright law as it applies to computer programs. First, the possessor
should have the legal right to copy the program to the extent necessary to use the
program.
This would include the right to load it into a computer and to prepare archi-
val copies of it to guard against destruction or damage by mechanical or
electrical failure. But this permission would not extend to other copies of
the program. Thus, one could not, for example, make archival copies of a
program and later sell some while retaining some for use. The sale of a
copy of a program by a rightful possessor to another must be of all rights in
the program, thus creating a new rightful possessor and destroying that sta-
tus as regards the seller. This is in accord with the intent of that portion of
the law which provides that owners of authorized copies of a copyrighted
work may sell those copies without leave of the copyright proprietor.
Id. at 13 (footnote omitted). Second, the possessor should have the legal right to
make changes to the program which are necessary to enable the use of the program
for which it was both sold and purchased.
The conversion of a program from one higher-level language to another to
facilitate use would fall within this right, as would the right to add features
to the program that were not present at the time of rightful acquisition.
These rights would necessarily be more private in nature than the right to
load a program by copying it and could only be exercised so long as they did
not harm the interest of the copyright proprietor. Unlike the exact copies
authorized as described above, this right of adaptation could not be con-
veyed to others along with the licensed or owned program without the ex-
press authorization of the owner of the copyright in the original work.
Preparation of adaptations could not, of course, deprive the original propri-
etor of copyright in the underlying work. The adaptor could not vend the
adapted program, under the proposed revision of the new law, nor could it
be sold as the original without the author's permission.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
19. Act of December 12, 1980 (Computer Software Act), Pub. L. No. 96-517,
§ 10(a), 94 Stat. 3028 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. 1982)). Section 101 de-
fined "computer program" as "a set of statements or instructions to be used directly
1988]
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B. Case Law.: Scope of Copyrightable Subject Matter
Prior to the Computer Software Act of 1980, only one case
squarely addressed the issue of copyright infringement of computer
programs.20 The court properly ruled that the 1976 version of sec-
tion 117 did not alter copyright protection as applied to computer
uses. It further ruled that common law and the 1909 Act were con-
trolling.21 The court concluded that copyright protection would not
extend beyond the source code (human-readable computer instruc-
tions) to object code (machine language instructions).22 Dicta from
or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result." 17 U.S.C. § 101
(1982). The revised section 117 reads:
§ 117. Limitations on exclusive rights: Computer programs.
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, it is not an infringement
for the owner of a copy of a computer program to make or authorize the
making of another copy or adaptation of that computer program provided:
(1) That such a new copy or adaptation is created as an essential step
in the utilization of the computer program in conjunction with a
machine and that it is used in no other manner, or
(2) That such new copy or adaptation is for archival purposes only and
that all archival copies are destroyed in the event that continued posses-
sion of the computer program should cease to be rightful.
Any exact copies prepared in accordance with the provision of this sec-
tion may be leased, sold, or otherwise transferred, along with the copy from
which such copies were prepared, only as part of the lease, sale, or other
transfer of all rights in the program. Adaptations so prepared may be trans-
ferred only with the authorization of the copyright owner.
17 U.S.C. § 117 (1982).
20. Data Cash Sys., Inc. v.JS& A Group, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 1063 (N.D. Il. 1979).
In Data Cash, the defendant marketed a chess computer program stored in ROM
(read only memory). The plaintiff had copyright registration on the source code,
which generated the object code program in ROM, but not on the object code itself.
There was no genuine issue of material fact and both parties moved for summary
judgment. Id. at 1066. Since the object code stored in the two ROMs was identical,
the court assumed direct copying. Id. The court found, however, that object code is
not copyrightable subject matter. See id. at 1068.
21. The court noted that the legislative history of section 117 indicates an intent
"to preserve the status quo" and that it was not intended to "cut off any rights ... or to
create new rights ...." Hence, the court concluded that it was to apply the law as it
stood prior to the 1976 Act, i.e., the court was to apply common law and the 1909
Act. Id. at 1067. Alternatively, "[e]ven if the 1976 Act did apply, copying of the
ROM would not be actionable," since the ROM would not constitute a "copy" under
the definition in section 101. Id. at 1066-67, n.4. While the definition of "copy"
encompasses works which may be perceived "with the aid of a machine or device,"
the court believed that only flow chart, source, and assembly phases but not ob-
ject/ROM phases would constitute a copy. The court reasoned that ROM is a
mechanical device, and "[m]echanical devices which cannot qualify as pictorial,
graphic or sculptural works are not writings and may not obtain copyright protec-
tion." Id.
22. The court determined that "[b]oth at common law and under the 1909 Act, a
'copy' must be in a form which others can see and read." Id. at 1068. Since ROM is
not in such a form, it cannot be a copy under common law or the 1909 Act and there
is no infringement. Id. at 1068-69. The court of appeals affirmed the summaryjudg-
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an earlier case, however, indicated that copyright protection would
extend beyond source code to the structure, sequence, and organiza-
tion of a program.2
3
Passage of the Computer Software Act has prompted a good deal
of litigation concerning the protection of various aspects of com-
puter programs. Courts have extended copyright protection to:
source code, 24 object code,25 database information,26 audiovisual
ment for the defendant but never reached the issue of whether ROM was a copy. See
Data Cash Sys., Inc. v. JS& A Group, Inc., 628 F.2d 1038, 1044 (7th Cir. 1980).
23. Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003
(N.D. Tex. 1978). In Synercom, the court stated in dicta that it is clearly an infringe-
ment to copy a program from one language to another. Likewise, it would probably
also be an infringement to copy the flow-chart or pseudo-code, i.e., the structure of
the program, in creating the source code. Id. at 1013, n.5. The court also stated:
It has long been the law that ". . . [i]n cases of literary or artistic works, and
works of similar character, in which the form, arrangement or combination
of ideas represents the product of labor and skilled effort separate and apart
from that entailed in the development of the intellectual conception in-
volved, that in such a situation, the medium of expression is entitled to pro-
tection by copyright against its adoption by another in similar form,
arrangement, and combination."
Id. at 1012-13 (citing Long v. Jordan, 29 F. Supp. 287, 288 (N.D. Cal. 1939)).
24. See, e.g., CMS Software Design Sys., Inc. v. Info Designs, Inc., 785 F.2d 1246,
1249 (5th Cir. 1986) (reversed and remanded trial court's grant of Rule 41 (b) invol-
untary dismissal motion where defendant marketed accounting programs with 80-
90% of its source code being identical to plaintiff's programs); Bly v. Banbury Books,
Inc., 638 F. Supp. 983, 985 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (infringement found when licensee made
an unauthorized copy of plaintiff's program by loading it from plaintiff's master disk
into main memory after license was cancelled); E.F. Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corp. of
America, 623 F. Supp. 1485, 1496 (D. Minn. 1985) (preliminary injunction granted,
when expert testimony revealed that 38 out of 44 subroutines found in plaintiff's
program were duplicated in defendant's program); Micro-Sparc, Inc. v. Amtype
Corp., 592 F. Supp. 33, 34 (D. Mass. 1984) (infringement found where defendant
typed copyrighted programs onto a masterdisk and then sold copies of the mas-
terdisk); Videotronics, Inc. v. Bend Electronics, 586 F. Supp. 478, 480 (D. Nev. 1984)
(court ordered preliminary injunction against defendant's sales and marketing of
program written by plaintiff).
25. See, e.g., M. Kramer Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 446 (4th Cir.
1986) (infringement found where defendant's object code was virtually identical to
plaintiff's object code and included a hidden legend that would appear on the display
only when certain buttons were pushed in an abnormal sequence); Apple Computer,
Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 725 F.2d 521, 523-25 (9th Cir. 1984) (preliminary injunc-
tion ordered where defendant manufactured and sold ROM chips storing the plain-
tiff's operating system); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d
1240, 1253 (3d Cir. 1983), cert denied, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984) (reversing denial of pre-
liminary injunction where defendant copied several ROM programs written by plain-
tiff and plaintiff was able to show that defendant could have created its own programs
to accomplish the same task); Williams Elec., Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870,
876-77 (3rd Cir. 1982) (injunction ordered to prevent defendant from marketing a
circuit board "kit" using a program "virtually identical" to plaintiff's); Atari, Inc. v.
JS& A Group, Inc., 597 F. Supp. 5, 7 (N.D. Il. 1983) (preliminary injunction ordered
where defendant manufactured a device which would make copies of games written
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output, 2 7 program structure, sequence, and organization,28 and
more recently, to the look and feel of the program. 29 An unlawful
by plaintiff); Tandy Corp. v. Personal Micro Computers, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 171, 173
(N.D. Cal. 1981) (denying defendant's motion to dismiss, ruling that copying of
silicon chip containing computer instructions is infringement). Contra Data Cash, 628
F.2d 1038, 1043-44 (affirming summary judgment motion for defendant, determin-
ing that copying program on ROM chip was not infringement where there was no
copyright notice on chip, gameboard, packaging, or accompanying instructions).
26. See, e.g., Koontz v. Jaffarian, 787 F.2d 906, 909 (4th Cir. 1986) (trial court's
finding of infringement upheld where defendant used plaintiff's data compilation to
create a data base substantially similar to plaintiff's); Rand McNally & Co. v. Fleet
Management Sys., Inc., 634 F. Supp. 604, 607-08 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (infringement
found where defendant created a data base by copying data from mileage charts com-
piled by plaintiff).
27. Audiovisual output is analyzed differently than the computer uses formerly
discussed, in that audiovisual output is deemed appropriate copyright subject matter
under 17 U.S.C. § 102 (a)(6), "motion pictures and other audiovisual works," as op-
posed to 17 U.S.C. § 102 (a)(1), "literary works". Courts ruling that copyright pro-
tection extends to audiovisual output have considered the issue in relation to
protection of video game displays. See, e.g., M. Kramer Mfg. Co., Inc., 783 F.2d at 434-
42; Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 704 F.2d 1009, 1011-12 (7th Cir. 1983);
Williams Electronics, Inc., 685 F.2d at 873-75; Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Nintendo
Co., 615 F. Supp. 838, 856-57 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) aff'd, 797 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1986).
28. See, e.g., Whelan Assoc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 797 F.2d 1222 (3rd Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 877 (1987) (infringement found due to substantial simi-
larity in file structure and management, screen output generation, and five subrou-
tines' structure); Williams v. Arndt, 626 F. Supp. 571, 579 (D. Mass. 1985)
(infringement found where defendant developed a computer program based on a
commodities market trading system described in plaintiff's book); SAS Institute, Inc.
v. S & H Computer Sys., Inc., 605 F. Supp. 816 (M.D. Tenn. 1985) (infringement
found where structure of defendant's program was substantially similar to plaintiff's
program). See also Q-Co Indus., Inc. v. Hoffman, 625 F. Supp. 608, 615-16 (S.D.N.Y.
1985) (although the court recognized the relevance of structure, sequence, and or-
ganization in considering copying, it found the idea of plaintiff's program, rather
than the expression of an idea was copied, and thus found no infringement);
Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003, 1012-
14 (N.D. Tex. 1978) (finding plaintiff's arrangement of data in input formats is ex-
pression). Contra Plains Cotton Co-op v. Goodpasture Computer Serv., 807 F.2d
1256, 1262 (5th Cir. 1987) (finding structure, sequence, and organization not
protectable).
29. See, e.g., Digital Communications Assoc. v. Softklone Distrib. Corp., 659 F.
Supp. 449, 456-60 (N.D. Ga. 1987) (permanent injunction granted based on finding
that plaintiff's arrangement and highlighting of user commands on visual screen was
expression, so that defendant's substantially similar arrangement infringed);
Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1127, 1135-37 (N.D.
Cal. 1986) (nonliteral infringement found based on both direct and circumstantial
evidence of copying and "eerie resemblance" between the screens). Several look and
feel opinions are pending. See Cadam, Inc. v. Adage, Inc., No. C-86-2146-T (D. Ma.
July 21,1986); Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Mosaic Software, No. 87-0074-K; Lotus Dev.
Corp. v. Paperback Software, No. 87-0076-K (D. Ma. Jan 12, 1987).
Look and feel cases are distinguishable from audiovisual cases. See supra note 27.
In audiovisual cases the question is whether protection extends to the screens when
the author has copyrights on the screens. In look and feel cases the question is
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appropriation of any one of these aspects of a computer program
may give rise to a copyright infringement action.
II. THE TEST FOR PROVING COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT OF
COMPUTER SOFTWARE
In order to prevail in an action for copyright infringement, the
plaintiff must prove his ownership of the copyright and a violation of
an exclusive right such as copying by the defendant.S0 Since a plain-
tiff is generally unable to produce evidence of actual copying, "copy-
ing may be proved inferentially by showing that the defendant had
whether protection extends to the screens and other aspects of the computer pro-
gram perceived by the user when the author has a copyright on the program.
30. "In order to establish a claim of copyright infringement, plaintiff must prove
(1) the existence, ownership, and validity of a copyright, and (2) defendants' violation
of the owner's exclusive rights set forth in the Copyright Act, such as reproduction of
the copyrighted work in copies or public distribution of copies." Ford Motor Co. v.
B & H Supply, Inc., 646 F. Supp. 975, 986 (D. Minn. 1986) (citing Sony Corp. of
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 433 (1984)). Accord E.F. John-
son Co. v. Uniden Corp. of America, 623 F. Supp. 1485, 1491-92 (D. Minn. 1985);
Animal Fair, Inc. v. Amfesco Indus. Inc., 620 F. Supp. 175, 185 (D. Minn. 1985),
aff'd, 794 F.2d 678 (8th Cir. 1986); Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc. v. Southern Satellite
Sys., Inc., 593 F. Supp. 808, 811 (D. Minn. 1984), aff'd, 777 F.2d 393 (8th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 643 (1986); Northwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Bedco of
Minn., Inc., 501 F. Supp. 299, 302 (D. Minn. 1980); 3 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPY-
RIGHT, § 13.01 (1987). The owner's exclusive rights are set forth in section 106 of
the Copyright Act:
[T]he owner... has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the
following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to
the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or
lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to per-
form the copyrighted work publicly; and
(5) in the case of literary, musical, or dramatic, and choreographic
works, pantomines, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, includ-
ing the individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work,
to display the copyrighted work publicly.
17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982).
Professor Nimmer describes ownership as consisting of five elements:
(1) Originality in the author, (2) copyrightability of the subject matter, (3)
citizenship status of the author such as to permit a claim of copyright,
(4) compliance with applicable statutory formalities, and (5) (if the plaintiff
is not the author) a transfer of rights or other relationship between the au-
thor and the plaintiff so as to constitute the plaintiff the valid copyright
claimant.
3 NiMMER, § 13.01 [A]. A certificate of copyright registration constitutes prima facie
evidence that the elements of ownership are satisfied. See 17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (1982).
See also Ford Motor Co., 646 F. Supp. at 987; E.F. Johnson Co., 623 F. Supp. at 1492;
Animal Fair, Inc., 620 F. Supp. at 185; West Pub. Co. v. Mead Data Cent., Inc., 616 F.
Supp. 1571, 1575 (D. Minn. 1985), aff'd, 799 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
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access to the allegedly infringed copyrighted work and that the alleg-
edly infringing work is substantially similiar to the copyrighted
work."31
107 S. Ct. 962 (1987). Nonetheless, the first two elements of ownership are quite
often contested by the other party.
The originality requirement obtains authority from section 102(a) of the Copy-
right Act. Copyright protection extends to "original works of authorship fixed in any
tangible medium of expression..." 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982). See West Pub. Co. v.
Mead Data Cent., Inc., 799 F.2d 1219, 1223 (8th Cir. 1986); National Football
League v. McBee & Bruno's, Inc., 792 F.2d 726, 731 (8th Cir. 1986); Toro Co. v. R &
R Products Co., 787 F.2d 1208, 1212 (8th Cir. 1986); Hutchinson Telephone Co v.
Fronteer Directory Co. of Minn., Inc., 770 F.2d 128, 131 (8th Cir. 1985); Donald v.
Uarco Business Forms, 478 F.2d 764, 765 (8th Cir. 1973). "The legislative history
states that the phrase 'original works of authorship' was intended to codify without
change the concept of 'originality' applied by the courts under the prior copyright
statute." Hutchinson Telephone Co., 770 F.2d at 131 (citing, H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 5659, 5664).
See also Toro Co., 787 F.2d at 1211-12.
"The standard for 'originality' is minimal. It is not necessary that the work be
novel or unique, but only that the work have its origin with the author - that it be
independently created." West Pub. Co., 799 F.2d at 1223. See also Toro Co., 787 F.2d at
1212; Hutchinson Telephone Co., 770 F.2d at 131; Donald, 478 F.2d at 765. Originality
requires only that the author invest some "creative intellectual or aesthetic labor."
Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973); West Pub. Co., 799 F.2d at 1223.
Even a very slight degree of labor may be sufficient so long as it distinguishes author-
ship and is not merely a trivial variation from other works. See id.; Toro Co., 787 F.2d
at 1212; Hutchinson Telephone Co., 770 F.2d at 131; Donald, 478 F.2d at 766.
The subject-matter requirement also derives its authority from section 102(a) of
the Copyright Act. The section lists the works of authorship which are copyrightable.
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982). Many computer applications are copyrightable. Courts
have extended copyright protection to source code, object code, data base informa-
tion, audiovisual output, structure, sequence, and organization, and look and feel.
See supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text. To date, only one Minnesota court has
considered the scope of copyright protection of computer software and ruled in favor
of extending protection to computer source code. See E.F. Johnson Co., 623 F. Supp.
at 1496.
Copyrightable subject matter also includes compilations and derivative works of
authorship. 17 U.S.C. § 103 (1982). See, e.g., West Pub. Co., 799 F.2d at 1224 ("an
arrangement of opinions in a case reporter, no less than a compilation and arrange-
ment of Shakespeare's sonnets, can qualify for copyright protection.").
31. Whelan Assoc., 797 F.2d at 1231-32. See also Ford Motor Co., 646 F. Supp. at
987; E.F. Johnson Co., 623 F. Supp. at 1492; Animal Fair, Inc., 620 F. Supp. at 188; 3
NIMMER, supra note 30, § 13.01[B].
Generally, copyright infringement consists of two elements: ownership and
copying. Obtaining direct evidence of copying is problematic. First, copying is usu-
ally intentional, and therefore, concealed, particularly from the owner of the copy-
righted work. Second, independent creation of the exact same work is not
infringement. Courts will avoid these problems by allowing circumstantial evidence
of copying. Evidence that the defendant had access to the copyrighted work and that
the allegedly infringing work is substantially similar to the copyrighted work provides
the logical inference that the defendant copied the plaintiff's work. See, e.g., E.F.
Johnson Co., 623 F. Supp. at 1492; 3 NIMMER, supra note 30, § 13.0l[B].
Access has been defined as actual viewing and knowledge of the copyrighted
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"The test of substantial similarity in the Eighth Circuit is 'whether
the work is recognizable by an ordinary observer as having been
taken from the copyrighted source'."3 2 The "ordinary observer"
test supports a finding of substantial similarity where, without the aid
or suggestion of expert testimony, the "spontaneous and immedi-
ate" reaction of the public is that the works are substantially
similar. 3
3
Courts have analytically split the "ordinary observer" test into two
steps when comparing sophisticated works beyond the understand-
ing of the ordinary observer. The two-step approach was initially set
forth in Arnstein v. Porter3 4 where the court held that under the first
step, expert testimony is admissible to define the similarities between
work by the infringer. See Bradbury v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 287 F.2d
478, 479 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. dismissed, 368 U.S. 801 (1961). Proof of actual viewing,
however, may be just as difficult to obtain as proof of actual copying. See 3 NIMMER,
supra note 30, § 13.02[A]. Often an opportunity to view will be sufficient to create an
inference of access. Smith v. Little, Brown & Co., 245 F. Supp. 451, 458 (S.D.N.Y.
1965), aff'd, 360 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1966). Other courts have accepted a reasonable
opportunity to view as direct evidence of access. See Kamar Int'l, Inc. v. Russ Berrie
& Co., 657 F.2d 1059, 1062 (9th Cir. 1981); Ferguson v. National Broadcasting Co.,
Inc., 584 F.2d 111, 113 (5th Cir. 1978); Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v.
McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 1977). In the context of computer
software, a defendant's awareness of the existence of a widely distributed copy-
righted work constituted proof of access. Midway Mfg., 546 F. Supp. at 145.
32. E.F. Johnson Co., 623 F. Supp. at 1492 (quoting Wihtol v. Crow, 309 F.2d 777,
780 (8th Cir. 1962)). See Animal Fair, Inc., 620 F. Supp. at 188. See also Warner Bros.,
Inc. v. American Broadcasting Co., Inc., 654 F.2d 204, 208 (2d Cir. 1981); Ideal Toy
Corp. v. Fab-Lu Ltd., 360 F.2d 1021, 1022 (2d Cir. 1966); Bradbury, 287 F.2d at 485.
The substantial similarity requirement was perhaps first articulated in Judge
Learned Hand's opinion in Nichols v. Universal Pictures Co., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir.
1930). He stated that when comparing two works "the question is whether the part
so taken is 'substantial,' and therefore not a 'fair use' of the copyrighted work." Id. at
121. Instead of applying the ordinary observer test, however, he applied what is
commonly called the "abstraction" test. The test involved abstracting expression
from the work leaving only idea and then determining whether a substantial amount
of expression was borrowed. Id. The ordinary observer test was first stated in Har-
old Lloyd Corp. v. Witwer, 65 F.2d 1, 19 (9th Cir. 1933): "[a] copy is that which
ordinary observation would cause to be recognized as having been taken from or the
reproduction of another." (emphasis in original).
33. Harold Lloyd Corp., 65 F.2d at 18 (9th Cir. 1933). Under the ordinary observer
test, substantial similarity is found when the allegedly infringing work has captured
the "total concept and feel" of the copyrighted work. See Roth Greeting Cards v.
United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1970); E.F. Johnson Co., 623 F. Supp.
1485, 1492-93 (citing Atari, Inc. v. North America Philips Consumer Elec. Corp., 672
F.2d 607, 614 (7th Cir. 1982)). An expert is not better qualified to judge the "con-
cept and feel" of a work than is an ordinary observer. Moreover, expert testimony
would only lead to "the classic difficulty of not being able to see the forest for the
trees." Frankel v. Irwin, 34 F.2d 142, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1918).
34. 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946). In Arnstein, the court reasoned that in applying
the ordinary observer test, "it is important to avoid confusing two separate elements
essential to a plaintiff's case in such a suit: (a) that the defendant copied from the
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the two works.3 5 Provided the similarities are sufficiently substantial
to infer copying, the second step requires that the ordinary observer
determine whether there was an improper appropriation of the copy-
righted work.36
In Sid & Marty Krofft v. McDonald's Corp. ,37 the 9th Circuit inter-
preted Arnstein as admitting expert testimony to evidence only simi-
larities in idea. If the idea is sufficiently similar to infer copying, the
ordinary observer is given the task of detecting similarities in expres-
sion.38 Commentators following the Krofft analysis of Arnstein have
argued that the two-step approach is not workable when applied to
computer software.39 The criticism is that it is unreasonable to ex-
plaintiff's copyrighted work and (b) that the copying (assuming it to be proved) went
so far as to constitute an improper appropriation." Id. at 468.
The Arnstein court's two-step approach describes the mental hoops an ordinary
observer must jump through in the traditional ordinary observer test. First, an ordi-
nary observer would compare and contrast the two works and determine whether
there was copying. Second, the ordinary observer would spontaneously decide
whether the similarities between the two works constitute an improper appropriation.
The test recognized that contrasting and comparing works of authorship is not a
spontaneous act and that experts may be useful for this purpose. Therefore, the
determination of whether the defendant copied from plaintiff's copyrighted work is
taken away from the ordinary observer.
Certainly, all copyright infringement cases involving sophisticated works of au-
thorship must admit expert testimony. In such cases, it would be impossible for the
ordinary observer to dissect and compare the two works. In Whelan, the court inter-
preted the Arnstein test according to the Krofft interpretation which prohibits expert
dissection of similarities in expression. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1232; See supra note 38
and accompanying text. Since expert testimony was needed to define these similari-
ties, the Whelan court rejected application of the Arnstein test. 797 F.2d at 1232. This
Note does not follow the Krofft interpretation of Arnstein. See infra note 41 and accom-
panying text. The Whelan court may have applied this Note's interpretation ofArn-
stein. In Broderbund, the court followed the Krofft interpretation ofArnstein, but expert
dissection of expression was not necessary since the comparison was merely between
video screens. Broderbund, 648 F. Supp. at 1136-37. Some courts simply do not state
which test is applicable and admit expert testimony for all purposes. See, e.g., E.F.
Johnson Co., 623 F. Supp. at 1492-93.
35. The Arnstein court stated that "[i]f there is evidence of access and similarities
exist, then the trier of the facts must determine whether the similarities are sufficient
to prove copying. On this issue, analysis ('dissection') is relevant, and the testimony
of experts may be received to aid the trier of the facts." Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468.
36. Id.
37. 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977).
38. See Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1165. Krofft interpreted Arnstein as "alluding to the
idea-expression dichotomy.. " Id. Under the Krofft interpretation, "copying" refers
merely to the permissible copying of ideas. The second step, improper appropria-
tion, refers to the unlawful copying of expressions. Id.
39. Two commentators advocated an "iterative" substantial similarity test. Note,
Copyright Infringement of Computer Programs: A Modification of the Substantial Similarit'y Test,
68 MINN. L. REV. 1264, 1285-88 (1984) [hereinafter Substantial Similarity]; Note, To-
ward a Unified Theory of Copyright Infringement For an Advanced Technological Era, 96 HARV.
L. REV. 450, 462 (1982) [hereinafter Unified Theory of Copyright Infringement]. See Note,
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pect that an ordinary observer can detect similarities in the expres-
sion of a computer program. 40 While it is true that the ordinary
observer cannot dissect a computer program and define the similari-
ties, this criticism is based on a misinterpretation of the Arnstein
test.4' The Arnstein two-step approach admits expert testimony to
evidence similarities in both idea and expression.
Proposed Judicial Guidelines for Deciding Software Infringement Actions, 32 WAYNE L. REV.
1191, 1208-12 (1986) (discussing these notes). Cf. Note, Copyright Infringement Ac-
tions: The Proper Role for Audience Reactions in Determining Substantial Similarity, 54 S. CAL.
L. REV. 385, 387 (1981) (criticizing lay observer standard when objects in question
are intended for a particular identifiable audience). Another commentator suggested
that the test for infringement focus on the defendant's conduct. Note, A Unifying
Theory For The Litigation of Computer Software Copyright Cases, 6 COMPUTER L. J. 55, 109
(1985).
40. One author argues that the current methods of proving substantial similarity
are not workable, stating:
Though courts now generally agree that copyright protection extends to
most forms of software, they lack a workable standard for determining when
infringement of copyrights in computer programs has occurred .... The
few courts that [have decided] whether a program constituted an illicit copy
of an original computer program, however, have either ignored the substan-
tial similarity test altogether, or stated that they were applying the test and
then ignored its standards.
Note, Substantial Similarity, supra note 39, at 1264-65. The author contends that
under both the traditional ordinary observer test and the Arnstein-Krofft two-step ap-
proach, the ordinary observer is required to detect similarities in expression. Id. at
1280. This is impossible when the subject matter is computer software, unless there
is expert evidence and detailed dissection of the work. Id. at 1280-84. An ordinary
observer test is therefore not workable. Id. at 1285-88. See also Note, Unified Theory of
Copyright Infringement, supra note 39, at 468 (1982) (the ordinary observer test is not a
good standard when the copyrighted work is a sophisticated technology).
41. Professor Nimmer argues that the Krofft interpretation of Arnstein is incorrect.
He points out that three of four cases cited inArnstein to illustrate copying "are exam-
ples of similarity of expression not merely of idea." 3 NIMMER, supra note 30,
§ 13.03[E] n. 121.7. Under Arnstein, the first step "probably calls for a determination
of whether there is substantial similarity of expression (not merely of idea), but this is
to be made regardless of the protectibility of such expression, while the [second step]
of substantial similarity is confined to that expression which is protectible by the
plaintiff." Id. at § 13.03[E].
Moreover, the Krofft reading of Arnstein is virtually absurd. If copying refers
merely to evidence of using the same idea, the first step of the test is useless. Evi-
dence of using the same idea employed by the plaintiff does not tend to prove copy-
ing of the plaintiff's copyrighted expression.
One commentator had the following thoughts on the Krofft interpretation of
Arnstein.
Krofft interprets Arnstein's two-step analysis to be the same idea/expression,
extrinsic-intrinsic test articulated in Krofft itself. Assuming arguendo that this
questionable interpretation of Arnstein is correct, the Krofft court's analysis
suffers from two major weaknesses.
First, since the Copyright Act does not protect ideas, the entire Krofft
extrinsic test is irrelevant to a copyright infringement action. As a practical
matter, any infringement suit in which the ideas are so disparate as to not be
substantially similar is a likely candidate for summary judgment.
1988]
17
Grammas: The Test for Proving Copyright Infringement of Computer Software:
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1988
WILLIAM MITCHELL LA W REVIEW
Under the Arnstein approach, the only task left to the ordinary ob-
server is to resolve the second step in the two-step test, determining
whether there was an "improper appropriation".42 It should be rec-
ognized since copyrightable subject matter is the particular expres-
sion of an idea, not the idea in its purest form,43 an appropriation is
"improper" only when expression is borrowed. Furthermore, proof
of infringement is predicated upon a finding of substantial similarity
between the two works.44 It follows that in order to find an "im-
proper appropriation," the ordinary observer must determine that a
substantial amount of expression was borrowed. The expert witness
does not impinge on this determination by dissecting the program,
defining similarities in idea and expression, and elaborating on tech-
nical reasons for the similarities. Instead, the expert testimony
merely provides the technical background to determine if a substan-
tial amount of expression was borrowed.
Restating the Arnstein two-step approach in light of this under-
standing of "improper appropriation", it is apparent that the two-
step approach is workable. First, expert testimony is admitted to evi-
dence all similarities in the two works regardless of whether the simi-
larities are of idea or expression. Further, the expert may supply the
Krofft's second problem lies in the restriction placed on the intrinsic test.
The Krofft court held that dissection and expert testimony are irrelevant
to the determination of substantial similarity in the expression of ideas, and
that the fact finder should consider only whether the accused work has cap-
tured the "total concept and feel" of the protected work. However, the "to-
tal concept and feel" test identifies only similarity between two ideas, which
may not be copyrighted, not between two expressions of an idea, which may be
copyrighted. Absent dissection and analysis, sanctioned in Arnstein, Krofft's
"total concept and feel" test is essentially indistinguishable from the older,
unworkable audience test.
Note, Proving Copyright Infringement, supra note 8, at 939 (1985) (emphasis in original).
The trend is to increase the use of expert testimony when separating idea from
expression. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1233; Broderbund, 648 F. Supp. at 1136; E.F. Johnson,
623 F. Supp. at 1493. See also FED R. EvID. 702 (expert testimony should be admitted
when it can help the trier of fact). Expert testimony is necessary since:
[w]ithout guidance, an ordinary [observer] may be unable to detect
well-disguised or highly modified programs. Using only the ordinary ob-
server audience test and their progeny [as in Krofft], the trier of fact may be
easily misled by unimportant factors when confronted with two disparate-
looking programs. Expert testimony in software copyright infringement
cases may be indispensable, and mechanical application of any infringement
test which prohibits such testimony may preclude a correct disposition.
Proving Copyright Infringement, supra note 38, at 941. See generally Note, Judicial Guide-
lines, supra note 2, at 1211 ("it is imperative that courts use expert testimony to point
out similarities to the fact finder"); Cf. Note, Expert Witnesses in Software Copyright In-
fringement Actions, 6 COMPUTER L.J. 35 (1985) (discussing practical issues in choosing
expert witnesses).
42. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468.
43. See, e.g., Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879). Compare 17 U.S.C. § 102(b)
(1982), with 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982).
44. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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ordinary observer with any other technical support needed to sepa-
rate similarities in idea from similarities in expression. Second, the
ordinary observer can then determine which similarities are similari-
ties in expression and whether the similarities in expression consti-
tute a substantial amount of the copyrighted work as a whole.45
The difficult issue for the ordinary observer is in separating the
similarities into idea and expression. There are no concrete rules.
In the words of Judge Learned Hand, the author of various leading
copyright opinions, "[o]bviously, no principle can be stated as to
when an imitator has gone beyond the 'idea,' and has borrowed its
'expression.' Decisions must therefore inevitably be ad hoc."46
Nonetheless, the factors for separating idea from expression in non-
literal infringement cases are illustrative of how this determination is
made by the ordinary observer.
III. THE STANDARD FOR SEPARATING IDEA FROM EXPRESSION IN
NONLITERAL INFRINGEMENT CASES
The idea/expression dichotomy has been raised in cases involving
nonliteral infringement of computer software. The issue has been
raised in structure, sequence, and organization cases including SAS
Institute, Inc. v. S&H Computer Systems, Inc. ,47 Q-Co Industries, Inc. v.
Hoffman,48 and Whelan Associates v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc. 49
More recently, the issue has been raised in look and feel cases includ-
ing Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc. 50 and Digital Commu-
nications Associates, Inc. v. Sofiklone Distributing Corp.51
A. Expression May Exist in Nonliteral Aspects of Computer Software
Creation of a computer program may be characterized in five
parts: 1) defining the purpose and function of the program; 2) de-
signing the data structure; 3) designing the modular structure;
45. For example, if expert testimony revealed that the two works were similar in
purpose, the ordinary observer may determine that the works are similar in idea only
and that the appropriation was proper. On the other hand, if expert testimony re-
vealed that the two works contained 200 lines of identical code and that there was no
technical reason for using identical source code, the ordinary observer may deter-
mine that the similarity in code was protectable expression. If the use of the code
constituted a substantial amount of the program, there would be an improper
appropriation.
46. Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (3d Cir.
1960). See also Nichols v. Universal Pictures Co., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930).
47. 605 F. Supp. 816 (M.D. Tenn. 1985).
48. 625 F. Supp. 608 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
49. 609 F. Supp. 1307 (E.D. Pa. 1985), aff'd, 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 107 S. Ct. 877 (1987).
50. 648 F. Supp. 1127 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
51. 659 F. Supp. 449 (N.D. Ga. 1987).
1988]
19
Grammas: The Test for Proving Copyright Infringement of Computer Software:
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1988
WILLIAM MITCHELL LA W REVIEW
4) designing the user interface; and 5) coding the program design
from parts two, three, and four into source code.52 While the literal
aspect of a program, the source code, is unequivocally protected with
a copyright on the program, the most creative expression resides in
the nonliteral aspects of designing the program.
To date, no court has squarely addressed the issue of whether part
two, the data structure, is protectable as a nonliteral aspect of the
copyrighted program.5 3 The data structure is the logical relation-
ship of information stored by the program. As the program is exe-
cuted, it uses information that resides in a memory storage device.
While the physical location of the information is irrelevant, opera-
tion of the program depends on the logical relationship of the infor-
mation as defined by the programmer. The logical data structure is
often arranged as a matter of programming style.
Three courts have considered whether part three-the modular
structure, otherwise known as structure, sequence, and organiza-
tion-is protectable as a nonliteral aspect of the copyrighted pro-
gram. 54 A computer program is composed of related procedures
which operate together to bring about a desired result. The pro-
gram structure, sequence, and organization is the way in which the
procedures relate. Designing the structure, sequence, and organiza-
tion "takes place in several steps, moving from general to specific."55
A few very general tasks known as modules or subroutines are cre-
ated. Each procedural module is broken down into successively
smaller and more detailed tasks until each detailed module performs
essentially one simple task.56 The structure, sequence, and organiza-
52. The author studied undergraduate computer science and has several years
experience as a computer programmer and consultant. The following section,
describing the different aspects of a computer program, is generally supported by the
author's personal knowledge of computer programming.
53. However, there was some evidence of copying of the plaintiff's data structure
in Whelan. 797 F.2d at 1228.
54. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
55. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1229. See generally D. BENDER, COMPUTER LAW SOFrWARE
PROTECTION § 2.06[3] (1985) (discussing the creation of a computer program).
56. For example, if the programmer were to design a program which would allow
the user to: 1) add, edit, and delete mailing labels in a computerized database; and
2) print-out all or some of the mailing labels in alphabetical order by last name, the
programmer could adopt the following general modules.
Step 1: Determine whether user requests: 1) modification of the database
(go to step 2), 2) output of mailing labels (go to step 3), or 3) end
program (call this MAIN-MENU MODULE).
Step 2: Add mailing label to database or delete mailing label from database
or edit mailing label in database. -return to step 1-
(call this MODIFY-FILE MODULE).
Step 3: Create a list of mailing labels and print the list. -return to step 1-
(call this PRINT-LABELS MODULE).
Within each one of these general modules, the programmer would develop more
detailed modules. For example, within the PRINT-LABELS MODULE, the program-
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tion may contain creative expression since decisions regarding the
breakdown and organization of procedures are based on the prefer-
ences and programming style of the programmer. As computer pro-
grams become more complex, there is more opportunity for creative
arrangement of the procedures.5 7
Designing part four-the user interface, otherwise known as look
and feel-is potentially the most creative aspect of the program.
Two courts have considered whether look and feel is protectable as a
nonliteral aspect of the copyrighted program.5 8 The look and feel is
mer may include a CREATE-LIST MODULE which would choose the labels to be
printed and alphabetize the list.
The alphabetizing function is a simple task that would not require further break-
down. A common method for alphabetizing is the "bubble sort." For example, if the
task were to alphabetize the letters D, E, F, A, the following algorithm could be used:
Bubble Sort Algorithm
Step 1: Compare the letter in first position with all letters to the right.
Where letters are not alphabetical, swap their position and con-
tinue comparing.
Step 2: Compare the letter in the second position with all letters to the
right. Where letters are not alphabetical, swap their position and
continue comparing.
Step 3: Compare the letter in the third position with all letters to the right.
Where letters are not alphabetical, swap their position and con-
tinue comparing.
In operation, the letters would be manipulated as follows, beginning with: D E F A
Step 1: Compare D and E; no change -
DEFA
Compare D and F; no change -
DEFA
Compare D and A; swap -
AEFD
Step 2: Compare E and F; no change -
AEFD
Compare E and D; swap -
ADFE
Step 3: Compare F and E; swap -
ADEF
On the other hand, the programmer could choose to alphabetize the mailing
labels as they are entered into the system as opposed to alphabetizing just prior to
print-out. In that case, the alphabetizing module would fall out of the MODIFY-FILE
MODULE rather than from the PRINT-LABELS MODULE. Clearly, at every turn a
computer programmer must make decisions that effect the structure of the program.
See Note, Defining the Scope of Copyright Protection for Computer Software, 38 STAN. L. REV.
497, 500-01 (1986) (discussing the breakdown of modules to smaller tasks).
57. The mailing label program described supra note 56 is fairly simplistic. There
are very few ways that the modules could be structured and organized. Designing
this type of program may not involve any creative expression - the programmer
would merely design the modular structure as his training dictates. In a more com-
plex program, there may be several alternative modular designs allowing for creative
expression.
58. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
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the program's " 'design, presentation, and output as experienced by
the user,' including the various observable attributes of the program
such as commands, graphics, sounds, symbols, sequences, arrange-
ment, and more general aesthetic qualities experienced by the
user."5 9 The look and feel is often manifested in the design of video
screens and command words which allow the computer and the user
to interact.60 The virtually unlimited supply of video images and
command words gives the programmer the widest possible creative
discretion. This task is particularly creative when the programmer
attempts to create a very "user friendly" system.
Not every program will contain protectable nonliteral expression.
Nonliteral aspects of the program, however, may be the program-
mer's most creative work, and some amount of copyright protection
must be available to protect these efforts. 61
B. Separating Idea from Expression in Structure, Sequence, and
Organization Cases
SAS,62 Q-Co,63 and Whelan 64 are nonliteral infringement cases
where the copyright owner claimed that the alleged infringer bor-
rowed the structure, sequence, and organization of the copyrighted
work. Using the copyrighted program's structure, sequence, and or-
ganization, the infringers were able to write new source code which
operated on a different computer system. 65 In each of the three
59. Note, "Look and Feel", supra note 2, at 416.
60. See, e.g., Sofiklone, 659 F. Supp. at 452; Broderbund, 648 F. Supp. at 1137.
61. The Copyright Act provides protection for "original works of authorship
fixed in a tangible medium of expression." 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1982). However, the
protection does not extend to ideas. Id. This Note will conclude that protection of
expression will extend to the creative efforts by the programmer and that the unpro-
tected idea is the functional aspect of the program. Further, creative efforts neces-
sary to the function of the program are merged with the function/idea and are also
unprotectable.
The purpose of this section is merely to demonstrate that nonliteral aspects of
the program are creative efforts that might be protected if not too closely linked to
the function of the program.
62. 605 F. Supp. 816 (M.D. Tenn. 1985).
63. 625 F. Supp. 608 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
64. 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986).
65. In SAS, the plaintiff owned a copyrighted statistical analysis program known
by its registered trademark as "SAS". SAS was designed to be run on IBM and IBM
compatible computers. The alleged infringing program, known as "INDAS" was de-
veloped by S & H Computer Systems to be a conversion of SAS, that would operate
on a VAX computer. SAS, 605 F. Supp. at 818.
In Q-Co, the plaintiff owned a copyrighted text-prompting program known as
"VPS-500". A text prompting program causes the computer to scroll large charac-
ters on a television screen to permit the speaker to read a prepared text by looking
directly ahead at the screen, thereby avoiding the appearance of reading. VPS-500
was designed to be run on an ATARI 800-XL computer. Here, as in SAS, the defend-
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cases the court found evidence of access and substantial similarity. 66
The Q-Co court, however, held that the defendant's program did not
infringe.67
In Q-Co, the defendent copied four modules from the plaintiff's
text-prompting program. 68 The court held that there was no in-
fringement since the plaintiff's modular structure was not copyright-
able expression. 69 Every text-prompting program would use the
same four modules embodying the same functions. The modular
structure employed was, therefore, inherent given the idea, and no
other expression could have been used.70 Nonetheless, the court did
ant merely converted the plaintiff's program so that it would run on a different com-
puter system. The defendant's program was known as "CPC-1000", and it operated
on an IBM PC. While the ATARI's graphics chip made the ATARI better suited as a
prompter, the IBM had greater memory which allowed it to process more text. Q-Co,
625 F. Supp. at 610-13.
In Whelan, the plaintiff owned a copyrighted dental business program known as
"Dentalab". The program was designed to perform bookkeeping and administrative
tasks. Dentalab was designed to run on an IBM Series One machine. The alleged
infringing program known as "Dentcom" was developed by the defendant as a con-
version of Dentalab that would run on smaller computer systems. Originally,
Dentalab was designed by the plaintiff for use in the defendant's lab. The defendant
later became a sales representative of the Dentalab program. As the defendant be-
came more familiar with computers, he realized the sales potential of a Dentalab
clone for smaller computers. He began converting Dentalab from EDL to BASIC in
his free time, thereby creating the Dentacom PC program. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1225-
26.
66. In SAS, the court found that all of the S & H's programmers had access to
SAS source code and documentation. The court further found substantial similarity
since: 1) SAS Institute was able to cite forty-four incidents of copying; 2) evidence of
copying SAS organization and structure pervaded the entire INDAS program; and
3) INDAS was developed in a fraction of the time required to develop SAS. In one
incident of copying, INDAS source code contained a functionless source code which
had accidently been left in the SAS source code after its intended function had been
abandoned. SAS, 605 F. Supp. at 828-30.
In Q-Co, access was clearly established since the defendant was an ex-employee
of the plaintiff and was instrumental in the design of VPS-500. The court found
substantial similarity since CPC-1000 contained four modules which corresponded
directly to four of twelve modules in VPS-500 and since the modules contained simi-
lar functions. Q-Co, 625 F. Supp. at 611-12, 614.
In Whelan, the district court established access based on the defendant's familiar-
ity with Dentalab. The program was designed for the defendant's dental practice and
he had access to the source code. The district court further found substantial similar-
ity in the structure, sequence, and organization of the program since there was simi-
larity in file structure, screen output, and five subroutines. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1242-
46.
67. Q-Co, 625 F. Supp. at 616.
68. Id. at 614.
69. "The evidence establishes that the modules in different languages were simi-
lar in the sense of 'ideas' rather than 'expressions' and as such have not been copied
in the infringement sense." Id. at 615.
70. Id. at 616. Notice, however, that the court was only referring to the general
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cite the earlier SAS case and recognized that under different circum-
stances, expression would extend to program structure, sequence,
and organization.
7 1
In SAS, the court held that expression extended to a program's
structure, sequence, and organization 7 2 since developing program
structure involves a virtually endless series of arbitrary choices.73
Thus, expression can be found wherever there is "room for varia-
tion" in creating a program's structure, sequence, and organization.
Where there are "only very limited ways" of creating the work, the
structure, sequence, and organization is not protectable.74
Although the Q-Co court did not discuss the differing levels of so-
phistication between the SAS program and the Q-Co program, that
distinction would reconcile the two cases. In SAS, there were several
possible structure, sequence, and organization designs, 75 and in Q-
Co, the court apparently found that there was only one. 76 SAS and Q-
Co taken together indicate that copyrightable expression is more
likely to exist in complex structure and organization designs as op-
posed to simplistic designs. A relatively simple structure, sequence,
and organization can be designed in only a very limited number of
ways. Such a design is dictated by necessity to the extent that the
programmer will not design an inefficient program. In contrast, a
complex program could be designed in a variety of ways, each of
which might be equally efficient. Development of this type of pro-
gram would be characterized by choice, not by necessity.
structure of the program, i.e., the four modules which were copied-title module,
load module, prompting module, and large-characters module. Within each of these
modules, however, is a more detailed structure which the court did not consider in its
analysis. So while ideas may have vested in the general structure, unique expression
may have existed in the more detailed structures of the individual modules.
71. Id.
72. SAS, 605 F. Supp. at 830. The court relied on Meredith Corp. v. Harper &
Row Publishers, Inc., 413 F. Supp. 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (infringement found where
topic selection and outline of book was copied).
73. Id. at 825. The court stated that:
[T]he author is faced with a virtually endless series of decisions as to how to
carry out the assigned task. Beginning with a broad and general statement
of the overall purpose of the program, the author must decide how to break
the assigned task into smaller tasks, each of which must in turn be broken
down into successively smaller and more detailed tasks. At the lowest levels
the detailed tasks are then programmed in source code. At every level, the
process [of developing a program's structure, sequence, and organization] is
characterized by choice often made arbitrarily, and only occasionally dic-
tated by necessity.
Id.
74. Id.
75. See id. at 825 ("the court finds that to the extent that similarities between SAS
and the S & H product have existed, they represent unnecessary intentional duplica-
tion of expression").
76. Q-Co, 625 F. Supp. at 616.
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The Whelan court took this proposition one step further with lan-
guage which appears to apply generally to the idea/expression di-
chotomy and not just to structure, sequence, and organization cases.
The court reasoned that "[w]here there are various means of achiev-
ing the desired purpose, then the particular means chosen is not nec-
essary to the purpose; hence, there is expression, not idea."77 In
general, structure, sequence, and organization cases separate idea
from expression by determining whether the means chosen by the
programmer were necessary or arbitrary.
Essentially, this is the same rule which was first promulgated in the
landmark case, Baker v. Selden. 78 In Baker, the court reasoned that
"where the art it [the idea in the plaintiff's book] teaches cannot be
used without employing the methods and diagrams used to illustrate
the book, or such as are similar to them, such methods and diagrams
are to be considered as necessary incidents to the art, and given
therewith to the public . . ."79
C. Separating Idea from Expression in Look and Feel Cases
Broderbund80 and Softklone8l are infringement cases in which the
copyright owners claimed that the alleged infringers appropriated
the video screens and command words of the copyrighted program,
thereby capturing the total look and feel of the work. These cases
follow the standard for separating idea from expression as set forth
in the structure, sequence, and organization cases.8 2 There is an im-
portant factual difference, however, between structure, sequence,
and organization cases and look and feel cases. A look and feel in-
fringer can borrow a program's video screens and command words
without ever accessing the actual computer program. Therefore,
there is an issue as to whether look and feel is a nonliteral aspect of
the computer program or a literal aspect of the video screens.8 3 If an
alleged infringer borrows the literal aspect of a video screen rather
than the nonliteral aspect of the program, copyright infringement
77. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1236.
78. 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
79. Id. at 103.
80. 648 F. Supp. 1127 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
81. 659 F. Supp. 449 (N.D. Ga. 1987).
82. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
83. Although a particular computer program may generate certain video screens,
a completely different program can generate the exact same screens. An alleged in-
fringer may literally copy a video screen (verbatim copying) without copying the un-
derlying program. Alternatively, an alleged infringer may copy the underlying
program in order to generate similar video screens. In the first instance there is
literal copying of the screens, and in the second instance, there is nonliteral copying
of the program.
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must be predicated on a copyrighted video screen, and cannot be
predicated on a copyrighted program.
1. Structure, Sequence, and Organization Factors
Applied in Look and Feel Cases
Generally, look and feel cases focus on the nexus between idea and
expression.84 When idea and expression merge, it is impossible to
protect expression without also creating a monopoly in the idea. As
the Softklone court noted, Baker stands for the proposition that "ideas,
as such, are not copyrightable and, as a corollary, necessary expres-
sion incident to an idea 'merge' with that idea and also are not
copyrightable . 85. "
The issue in look and feel cases is whether the technical con-
straints of designing the video screens and command words cause
the expression to merge with the idea. For example in Broderbund,
Broderbund negotiated with Unison to have Unison develop a con-
version of a program from Apple to IBM.86 When negotiations dete-
riorated, Unison created their own version of the program but
retained Broderbund's menu screens and input formats.87 Since
Broderbund was able to demonstrate to the court that a similar pro-
gram expressed the same ideas in a different way,8 8 the court held
that Unison had infringed upon Broderbund's copyrighted pro-
gram. 89 The expression in question was not a necessary incident to
the underlying ideas.
Similarly, the Softklone court found that ForTec had infringed when
it borrowed the copyrighted "status screen" from Microstuff's pro-
gram. 90 While the court found some aspects of the screen to be un-
protectable ideas,91 it found that the command terms and the
84. "[I]f an idea is indistinguishable from its expression, that is, if the idea is
'merged' into its expression, the expression cannot be protected under the copyright
laws." Broderbund, 648 F. Supp. at 1131.
85. Softktone, 659 F. Supp. at 457.
86. Broderbund, 648 F. Supp. at 1130-31.
87. Id. at 1131.
88. At trial, plaintiffs introduced another program that performed essentially the
same function. However, this program generated very different screens. Id. at 1132.
The court stated that "there do exist other, quite different ways of expressing the
ideas embodied in [the copyrighted program]. The court rejects defendant's conten-
tion that the idea and expession of [the copyrighted program] are indistinguishable
from one another." Id.
89. Id. at 1138.
90. Softklone, 659 F. Supp. at 465. Plaintiffs had developed a program called
Crosstalk which enabled the user's computer to communicate with other computers.
The program received widespread support because of its main menu called the "sta-
tus screen". Id. at 452. The defendant's program served the same function and used
a similar main menu. Id. at 453.
91. The court found that:
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sequencing of commands were not a necessary incident to the idea.92
The choice of using two-letter commands and the sequencing was
not technically constrained by programming needs.93 Since other
choices where equally feasible, there was copyrightable expression.94
The "merged idea" standard for separating idea from expression
in Broderbund and Sofiklone is entirely consistent with the neces-
sary/arbitrary distinction in Whelan95 and other structure, sequence,
and organization cases. Where there are alternative methods for de-
signing the program and the programmer chooses one design arbi-
trarily, there is protectable expression.96 Where, in all practicality, it
is necessary to design the program in a particular way, expression is
merged with idea and is unprotectable. 97 And of course, the func-
tion or purpose of the program is the unprotectable idea.
98
2. Literal or Nonliteral Copying
Look and feel cases and structure, sequence, and organization
cases may separate idea from expression in the same way. There is,
The use of a screen to reflect the status of the program is an 'idea;' the use
of a command driven program is an 'idea;' and the typing of two symbols to
activate a specific command is an 'idea.' All of these elements relate to how
the computer program receives commands or instructions from the user and
how operationally the computer program reflects the results of those
commands.
Id. at 459.
92. Id.
93. "The arrangement of the parameter/command terms has no relation to how
the computer operates .... Likewise, the highlighting and capitalizing of two specific
letters of the parameter/command terms listed on the status screen has no relation to
how the status screen functions . I..." d  Therefore, these aspects of the computer
program were not necessary incidents to the idea behind the program.
94. The copyrighted program
could not have been expressed in a large variety of ways .... The modes of
expression chosen by the plaintiff for its status screen are clearly not neces-
sary to the idea of the status screen. Therefore, the plaintiff's mode of ex-
pression of the status screen does not merge with the idea of the status
screen.
Id. at 460.
95. 797 F.2d 1222.
96. Softklone, 659 F. Supp. at 460 ("arrangement of the status screen involves
considerable stylistic creativity ... the defendants could have used a wide variety of
techniques"); Broderbund, 648 F. Supp. at 1132 ("there do exist other, quite different
ways of expressing the ideas").
97. Softklone, 659 F. Supp. at 460 ("the modes of expression chosen by the plain-
tiff for its status screen are clearly not necessary to the idea .. .plaintiff's mode of
expression of the status screen does not merge with the idea"); Broderbund, 648 F.
Supp. at 1132 (expression does not merge with idea because of alternative ways of
expressing the idea).
98. Softklone, 659 F. Supp. at 458 (" 'idea' is the process or manner by which the
status screen ... operates"); Broderbund, 648 F. Supp. at 1132 (functions underlying
the program are the idea).
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however, one crucial difference between the two types of cases. An
infringer may borrow the look and feel without ever copying the pro-
gram.99 Video screens can be duplicated by simply observing the
operation of a program. If the look and feel is taken in this way, the
infringer has not borrowed a nonliteral aspect of the program.
Rather, the infringer has literally copied the video screens.100
Broderbund did not address this issue, but perhaps the court did not
need to address the issue. In Broderbund, there was no question that
Unison used the copyrighted program in duplicating the look and
feel of the program. 0 1 The fact that Unison used either the literal
or nonliteral substance of the copyrighted program should be suffi-
cient to predicate a finding of infringement of the program.
The Softklone court did address this issue and held that "copyright
protection [of computer software] does not extend to the program
screen displays... and does not state a claim of infringement."102
Instead, the court predicated infringement on the copyrighted "sta-
tus screen".103 The court refused to find infringement of the pro-
gram because "the same screen can be created by a variety of
separate and independent computer programs," and therefore, "[i]t
is somewhat illogical to conclude that a screen can be a 'copy' of
many different programs." 04 The flaw in the court's logic, however,
is that the screen may in fact have been copied from one particular
program as was the case in Broderbund.105 In Softklone, there was no
evidence that the defendant used the copyrighted program. When
the infringer actually uses the program, borrowing the look and feel
is nonliteral infringement of the program. However, when the infringer
uses only the program's visual displays, borrowing the look and feel
is literal infringement of the video screens.
Regardless of whether look and feel is the nonliteral aspect of the
program or the literal aspect of the screens, the idea/expression di-
chotomy is at issue since screens are a type of "form".106 Blank
forms are only copyrightable to the extent that they contain creative
99. This was precisely the situation in Softklone. Id. at 453.
100. In Softklone, the court did not find that the defendant infringed the copy-
righted program but did find that the defendant infringed the copyrighted status
screen. Id. at 465.
101. The defendants had access to the source code pursuant to a licensing agree-
ment between the plaintiff and defendant. Broderbund, 648 F. Supp. at 1130-31.
102. Sofiklone, 659 F. Supp. at 456.
103. Id. at 465.
104. Id. at 455-56.
105. Broderbund, 648 F. Supp. at 1131.
106. Sofiklone, 659 F. Supp. at 460-62. Examples of blank forms include time
cards, graph paper, account books, diaries, bank checks, score cards, address books,
report forms, order forms and the like, designed for recording information. Id. at
461.
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expression.'07 The court must separate the idea underlying the
screen from the particular expression used in the screen.
D. Combining the Test for Proving Copyright Infringement With the
Standard for Separating Idea from Expression
The most recent cases involving copyright infringement of com-
puter software have presented difficult idea/expression issues. The
preceding analysis of these cases reveals that a programmer is free to
use those aspects of another's program that are necessary to the cre-
ation of the new program but is forbidden to use those aspects of
another's program that were arbitrarily chosen from the various
means of designing such a program.10 8
The Arnstein two-step approach' 0 9 for proving copyright infringe-
ment may once again be restated in light of this standard for separat-
ing idea from expression. First, the expert witness testifies as to the
similarities in the two works and the technical reasons for the similar-
ities. Second, the ordinary observer determines whether the similar-
ities were caused by necessary or unnecessary programming
decisions and whether the unnecessary similarities are substantial in
relation to the work as a whole. As an evidentiary matter, this analy-
sis of proving copyright infringment of computer software does not
assign the ordinary observer any insurmountable tasks despite the
complexities of the idea/expression dichotomy. 110
107. Creative expression refers to those works which provide the user with infor-
mation beyond the simple indication of where to find data. Id.
108. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
109. See supra notes 34-45 and accompanying text.
110. The method for separating idea from expression as described in this Note
has been referred to as a "plurality test." Expression is protectable if it can be ex-
pressed in a plurality of ways. Note, "Look and Feel", supra note 2, at 427-28.
The plurality of expressions test combines several distinct advantages.
First, the test is clear and relatively easy to apply. Instead of determining a
cutoff between levels of abstraction, this test simply asks whether an idea
can be expressed in a plurality of manners. Thus, the test is based on tangi-
ble and discreet factors instead of vague abstractions.
Second, this test is likely to yield more consistent and predictable re-
sults. By focusing attention on the various ways to express an idea, one
generally reaches a few possible conclusions. If only one way to express an
idea exists then the law provides no copyright protection. When the list of
possible expressions is infinite, copyright law should permit protection, but
when there are limited possibilities, the law should not provide copyright
protection.
Most importantly, the plurality test incorporates the idea/expression
analysis and other underlying policies of copyright law. A copyright is a
limited monopoly over a particular expression. Therefore, even if the au-
thor monopolizes one expression, the plurality test allows healthy competi-
tion because viable, alternative ways to express the same idea still exist.
Id. at 428-29 (footnotes omitted).
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IV. THE STANDARD FOR SEPARATING IDEA FROM EXPRESSION IS
CONSISTENT WITH POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
In evaluating the policy considerations of the idea/expression di-
chotomy, it should initially be noted that, "in the copyright lexicon,
'idea' is no more than a metaphor for elements generally belonging
in the public domain."''' I Overprotection is the result of "judicially
created monopolies"' 1 2 in works which should be dedicated to the
public domain. Therefore, if a standard caused courts to protect the
idea used in a computer program or the expression merged with the
idea, the standard would lead to overprotection.13 The standard
advocated in this Note does not protect aspects of the program that
111. Note, Infringement of Copyright in Computer Programs, 47 U. PrTr. L. REV. 1119,
1126 (1986).
112. Judicially created monopolies exist when courts extend copyright protection
to works which should be unprotected under section 102(b). As a result, the copy-
right owner aquires exclusive rights in the work under section 106.
113. Some commentators believe that any standard which protects nonliteral as-
pects of a program inherently leads to overprotection. It has been argued that pro-
tection of nonliteral aspects of computer programs stifles innovation. The thinking is
that "[o]ne cannot simply 'approximate' the entire copyrighted computer program
and create a similar operative program without the expenditure of almost the same
amount of time as the original programmer expended." Note, Substantial Similarity,
supra note 39, at 1290. Therefore, the imitator's work is innovative and it should not
be discouraged. The assumption is not true. For example, in SAS the court found
that where an imitator copied another's structure, sequence, and organization, the
imitator's program was developed in a fraction of the time required to develop the
original. SAS, 605 F. Supp. at 826. In any event, the fact that it will take a great deal
of effort to copy a copyrighted work does not mean that the copier is not an infringer.
It is also thought that computer programs should not be protected because they
are functional and beyond the scope of copyright. The premise is that "[c]omputer
programs are fundamentally different from most other literary works that produce
technological growth in that the program itself both expresses the innovation and
performs the new operation." Note, Substantial Similarity, supra note 39, at 1292. Ac-
cording to this argument, a programmer is not able to apply the teachings of the
copyrighted program in contrast to other literary works, like books, where one can
apply its teachings without fear of infringement. Hence, innovation and develop-
ment are stifled. While there may be a factual distinction between computer pro-
grams and other literary works, computer software infringement cases do not involve
innovative imitators.
Typically the imitator will merely convert the program from one computer sys-
tem to another. See, e.g., Q-Co, 625 F. Supp. 608 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (conversion of text
prompting program, from Atari to IBM computer system); E.F. Johnson Co. v.
Uniden Corp. of America, 623 F. Supp. 1485 (D. Minn. 1985) (conversion of LTR-
compatible radio program); Whelan, 609 F. Supp. 1307 (conversion of dental-busi-
ness program from large IBM to small IBM system); SAS, 605 F. Supp. 816 (conver-
sion of statistical analysis program, from IBM to VAX computer system).
Furthermore, "the copyright law has always recognized and tried to accomodate the
fact that all intellectual pioneers build on the work of their predecessors. Thus, copy-
right principles derived from other areas are applicable in the field of computer pro-
grams." Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1238 (criticizing Note, Substantial Similarity, supra note
39). Lastly, the standard advocated in this Note does not protect aspects of a com-
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belong in the public domain. It provides protection for the
programmer's creative efforts while promoting dissemination of pro-
gramming techniques needed to implement new programming ideas.
Necessary programming techniques must remain in the public do-
main if the computer industry is to continue to be innovative.
A. New Programming Techniques Remain in the Public Domain
In order to evaluate the works that belong in the public domain, it
is useful to compare copyright protection to patent law. Patent and
copyright laws derive their power from the Constitution, 14 and are
enacted by federal statutes. 1 5 Together, these forms of protection
define the public domain.
Some aspects of a computer program may be dedicated to the pub-
lic domain. A computer program is primarily a process, a set of in-
structions which bring about a certain result.'16 Processes are
excluded from copyright protection, '7 and, additionally, may be
dedicated to the public domain as uninventive patentable subject
matter. A work is dedicated to the public domain by operation of
patent law when it is patentable subject matter but does not meet the
high standards of inventiveness required to be patented.118 A stan-
dard for separating idea from expression which provides copyright
protection for the process aspect of a computer program would con-
flict with patent law by protecting works which may be dedicated to
the public domain.
puter program that are closely linked to the "new operation". See supra notes 95-98
and accompanying text.
114. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Article I, § 8, cl. 8 gives Congress the power
"[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries."
115. Copyrights Act §§ 1-215, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (Supp. 1985); Patents Act
§§ 1-293, 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1982).
116. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (defining computer program).
117. 17 U.S.C § 102(b) (1982). "Section 102(b) is intended, among other things,
to make clear that the expression adopted by the programmer is the copyrightable element in a
computer program, and that the actual processes or methods embodied in the program
are not within the scope of the copyright law." CONTU, FINAL REPORT, supra note
11, at 19 (quoting U.S., Congress, Senate, Judiciary Committee, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess., 1975, S. Rep. No. 54) (emphasis in original).
118. Works whose subject matter is patentable are excluded from other forms of
protection for two reasons. First, federal forms of protection preempt state or com-
mon law protection. See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964)
(lamp pole not eligible for trademark protection because patentable subject matter).
Second, copyright and patent law do not overlap in protection. Section 102(b) of the
Copyright Act explicitly excludes patentable subject matter from protection. Compare
17 U.S.C. § 102(b) with 35 U.S.C. § 101. Therefore, if patentable subject matter can-
not be protected under the Patent Act, it is dedicated to the public domain. 35
U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (1984).
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Furthermore, copyright protection of a process would convert the
Copyright Act into a general misappropriation statute.' 1 9 Copyright
is a type of misappropriation statute protecting against the improper
appropriation of a select set of intellectual works.120 The framers'
intent to prevent the creation of a general misappropriation statute
is clear from section 102(b) of the Copyright Act 12 1 and the policy of
promoting the widest possible dissemination of ideas.122
The standard advocated in this Note does not protect the process
aspect of a computer program. Under the standard, a programmer is
allowed to borrow any aspect of another's program which is needed
to automate the process in the copyrighted program or a similar pro-
cess. The programmer is prohibited from using only the technically
unneeded creative efforts of another.123
In addition, the standard promotes a desirable economic policy.
"One of the hallmarks of a competitive industry is the ease with
which entrepreneurs may enter into competition with firms already
doing business. The absence of significant barriers to entering the
program-writing market is striking."124 The competitive process
would be injured if programmers could hoard their technological ad-
vantages. This is not the case. Any necessary programming tech-
nique which is not patented or held as a trade secret is freely
accessible. The standard prevents only wholesale-type copying of
another's creative work product. This type of copying is counter-
competitive since it allows an infringer to drastically reduce produc-
tion costs and reap unearned profits.125
B. Two Instances of Overprotection
To the extent that courts have separated idea from expression
119. Nimmer warned of this result in CONTU, FINAL REPORT, supra note 9:
If literary works are to be so broadly construed, the Copyright Act becomes a
general misappropriation law, applicable as well in what has traditionally
been regarded as the patent arena, and, indeed, also in other areas to which
neither copyright nor patent law has previously extended. This poses a seri-
ous constitutional issue in that it is arguable that such an approach stretches
the meaning of authors and writings as used in the Copyright Clause of the
Constitution beyond the breaking point.
Id. at 26 (emphasis in original).
120. The set of selected works is defined in 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). See supra note 14
and accompanying text.
121. Section 102(b) of the Copyright Act explicitly limits copyright protection
against general misappropriation of things like ideas, functions and processes.
122. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
123. See Whalen, 797 F.2d at 1236. See also supra notes 95-98 and accompanying
text.
124. CONTU, FINAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 23.
125. SAS, 605 F. Supp. at 826 ("by expropriating a completed and proven design,
[the defendant] was saved the substantial time and effort of developing its own origi-
nal design").
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consistent with the standard advocated in this Note, current trends in
software protecton have not lead to overprotection. In the two in-
stances that follow, the courts did not comply with the standard and,
as a result, protected works that belong in the public domain. It
should be noted that, while these are not pure computer software
cases, they do involve related subject matter.
In Williams v. Arndt,126 the court extended copyright protection to
a method of operation.127 Williams developed a method for trading
in various commodities and published a booklet entitled Floor
Trader's Method.128 Arndt later used this method in a computer pro-
gram.' 2 9 The court found that the program and the booklet used
many of the same procedurestso and produced the same results.131
The court further found that designing the program was merely a
clerical task lacking in creative expression.132 Based on these find-
ings, the court held that Arndt's computer program infringed upon
the copyrighted booklet.133
Arndt should not have been prohibited from borrowing the
method of trading. The Copyright Act expressly excludes methods
of operation and processes from copyrightable subject matter.134
Therefore, the court's finding, that the same procedures were used
and the same results produced, does not imply that Arndt borrowed
protectable expression. These aspects of the copyrighted work were
closely linked to the idea underlying the Floor Trader's Method and
would, therefore, be unprotectable under the standard for separat-
ing ideas from expression. 3 5
The court's second finding, that the programming was merely a
clerical function lacking in expression, is irrelevant.t36 The inquiry
is not whether the allegedly infringing work contains protectable ex-
126. 626 F. Supp. 571 (D. Mass. 1985).
127. Id. at 579.
128. Id. at 573.
129. Id. at 574.
130. Id. at 576.
131. Id. at 579.
132. Id. As stated by the court:
Writing the program may be a task requiring a great deal of inventiveness,
or it may be merely a clerical function. To a skilled programmer, the con-
version of known input, known output, the mathematical expressions
needed and the methods of transferring those expressions into computer
language is necessarily a mere clerical function.
Id. at 577.
133. Id. at 581.
134. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982).
135. See supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
136. The court concluded that "the source code in this case is not a different and
unique expression of a well known idea." Williams, 626 F. Supp. at 578. The unique-
ness of the defendant's work is irrelevant. In fact, the court's statement tends to
imply that the defendant borrowed only ideas from the copyrighted work.
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pression. Rather, the issue is whether the alleged infringer bor-
rowed a substantial amount of another's protectable expression.137
Similarly, copyright protection was extended to the functional as-
pect of an animated toy in the recent group of cases colletively
known as the Teddy Ruxpin Cases.1 3 8 Teddy Ruxpin is a toy bear
whose eyes, nose, and mouth move in synchronization with his voice
when a specially designed cassette tape is inserted in his back.139
Worlds of Wonder (WOW) copyrighted Teddy Ruxpin as an audio-
visual work.14 0 Two separate infringement suits were brought
against manufacturers of tapes that activated Teddy Ruxpin. In both
cases, the courts granted the temporary injunctions finding likeli-
hood of infringement of the copyright on Teddy Ruxpin because the
tapes duplicated the look and feel of the audiovisual effect of Teddy
Ruxpin. 141
Surprisingly, one court did not accept the argument made by the
defendant that the copyright should have been on the tapes - not
on Teddy Ruxpin.142 Teddy Ruxpin is merely a sophisticated tape
player. It is far beyond the scope of copyright to protect a mechani-
cal device which generates sound and image.143
Even assuming, arguendo, that infringement may be predicated on
the Teddy Ruxpin copyright, the defendants should not have been
prohibited from activating the motors in the face of the toy. Apply-
ing the standard for separating idea and expression, the idea is an
animated bear. Causing the bear to be animated by activating Teddy
Ruxpin's eyes, nose, and mouth is a necessary incident to the idea
and therefore is unprotectable.144 The defendants should only have
been prohibited from using the same or substantially similar se-
quence of movements. Also, it would be appropriate, as one of the
courts noted, to prohibit the use of the Teddy Ruxpin voice and
story theme.145 Under the standard, these are arbitrary choices of
expression because many other voices and stories are available.14 6
137. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
138. See Worlds of Wonder, Inc. v. Veritel Learning Sys., Inc., 658 F. Supp. 351
(N.D. Tex. 1986); Worlds of Wonder, Inc. v. Vector Intercontinental, Inc., 653 F.
Supp. 135 (N.D. Ohio 1986) (preliminary injunction granted); 1987 Corp.L.Dec.
26,063, 1 U.S.P.Q 2d 1987 (BNA) (N.D. Ohio Dec. 31, 1986); (mem. No. C86-2671)
(granting permanent injunction, damages and attorney's fees).
139. Veritel, 658 F. Supp. at 352; Vector, 653 F. Supp. at 137.
140. Veritel, 658 F. Supp. at 353; Vector, 653 F. Supp. at 138.
141. Veritel, 658 F. Supp. at 357; Vector, 653 F. Supp. at 141.
142. See Veritel, 658 F. Supp. at 354-55. This issue was not raised in the Vector case.
143. If it is valid to copyright Teddy Ruxpin as an audiovisual work, why not copy-
right a VCR and prevent others from producing VHS tapes? The only difference is
that a VCR can create a wider variety of visual images when connected to a TV.
144. See supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
145. Vector, 653 F. Supp. at 140.
146. See supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
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In both Arndt and the Teddy Ruxpin cases, the works were appro-
priate subject matter for a utility patent on a process. 14 7 The failure
to obtain patent protection dedicated the works to the public do-
main.148 Logical extremes of Arndt and the Teddy Ruxpin cases lead
to bizarre results because copyright protection was extended to
works in the public domain. For example, some computers are
loaded with a cassette tape containing encoded sounds. If the tape
caused the computer to create images on the screen which told sto-
ries to children, would the Courts in the Teddy Ruxpin cases allow
the manufacturers to obtain a copyright on the computer and
thereby prevent others from producing cassettes which activated the
computer? What if the computer were designed as a soft sculpture
toy? It is unclear what precedential value these cases will have on
computer software litigation.
CONCLUSION
This Note discussed the creative programming efforts associated
with designing nonliteral aspects of a computer program-the struc-
ture, sequence, and organization and the look and feel. 14 9 Given the
policy of the Copyright Act to encourage production of creative and
innovative works,15 0 there is no question that nonliteral aspects of
the computer program should be protected. The question is how to
prove copyright infringement of the computer program when the al-
leged infringer borrowed the nonliteral aspect. The troublesome is-
sue is whether the alleged infringer borrowed idea or expression.
An ordinary observer without any special understanding of computer
programming must make the determination.151
This Note advocates a simple standard for separating idea from
expression which the ordinary observer can apply in the Arnstein two-
step infringement test. In the first step, the court admits expert testi-
mony to evidence similarities in the two works and the technical rea-
sons for the similarities. In the second step, the ordinary observer
considers the expert testimony and separates similarities in idea
from similarities in expression. The ordinary observer then deter-
mines whether the similarities in expression are a substantial part of
the copyrighted work.
The standard advocated in this Note aids the ordinary observer in
the separation of idea from expression. Where there are alternative
147. Patentable subject matter includes processes like the floor trading method in
Arndt and articles of manufacture like the Teddy Ruxpin bear in the Teddy Ruxpin
Cases. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1984).
148. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
149. See supra notes 51-61 and accompanying text.
150. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
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methods for designing the program and the programmer chooses
one design arbitrarily, there is protectable expression. Where, in all
practicality, it is necessary to design the program in a particular way,
expression is merged with idea and is unprotectable. The function
or purpose of the program is the unprotectable idea.
Application of this standard is desirable for two reasons. First, it
facilitates a workable method for proving copyright infringement.
And second, it is consistent with the policies of the Copyright Act:
providing protection for the programmer's creative efforts while pro-
moting dissemination of programming techniques needed to imple-
ment new programming ideas.
George N. Grammas
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